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INTRODUCTION
North Carolina has been ground zero for much of the United States
Supreme Court’s redistricting work. Thornburg v. Gingles,1 a 1986 challenge
to various North Carolina state electoral districts, famously determined when
the Voting Rights Act requires a majority-minority district to prevent vote
dilution.2 Shaw v. Reno,3 the high court’s landmark 1993 constitutional
ruling, also originated in North Carolina. Shaw and its successor Shaw II
(1996)4 held that a state legislature’s use of race as “the predominant factor”
in drawing an electoral district violates the Equal Protection clause—even,
oddly, if no vote dilution occurs.5 Hunt v. Cromartie and Easley v.
Cromartie,6 decided several years later, again examined Tar Heel districts as

* © 2021 Gene R. Nichol.
** Boyd Tinsley Distinguished Professor, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1

478 U.S. 30 (1986).

2

Id. at 69.

3

509 U.S. 630, 633–34 (1993).

4

517 U.S. 899 (1996).

5

See id. at 905–18.

6

Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).

NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

1:69

2021

the Court further outlined its unfolding and controversial standards for
reviewing race-based discrimination claims.7 More recently, Cooper v.
Harris8 sought to synthesize earlier Voting Rights Act rulings with the now
more substantially honed constitutional standards announced in Shaw v.
Reno.9 Cooper made clear that North Carolina legislators could neither use
the purported standards of the Voting Rights Act nor alleged assertions of
partisan motivation to draw lines “predominantly” employing “the use of
race” to set electoral boundaries.10 And most notably, in Rucho v. Common
Cause,11 the United States Supreme Court concluded in 2019:
Partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond
the reach of the federal courts . . . federal judges have no license to
reallocate political power between the two major political parties,
with no plausible grant of authority in the Constitution, and no legal
standards to limit and direct their decisions.12
Partisan gerrymandering, Chief Justice Roberts also concluded for the Rucho
majority, should not be equated with presumptively illegitimate racial line
drawing. A “permissible intent—securing partisan advantage—does not
become constitutionally impermissible, like racial discrimination, when that
permissible intent ‘predominates.’”13 Rucho, too, was a North Carolina
venture. The state has been busy. Even if unhelpful.
North Carolina has, then, provided the factual fodder for the
development of much of modern statutory and constitutional gerrymandering
jurisprudence. It has also, apparently, often operated at the purported axis
between racial and political claims. It has occupied the landscape inhabited
by both enthusiastically embraced racial gerrymandering actions and
7

See Easley, 532 U.S. at 258.

8

137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).

9

Id. at 1468–72.

10

Id.

11

139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).

12

Id.at 2506–07.

13

Id. at 2503.
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judicially rejected political gerrymandering suits. The repeated, decades-long
undertakings of the North Carolina General Assembly have, surely, helped
convince the federal justices that the consequence-laden distinction between
political and racial work is not only defining, but ascertainable. The
distinction marks the boundary, it is claimed, between legitimate—even
essential—constitutionally derived judicial review and devastating, usurping
“government by judiciary.”14
There is much to quibble with, or worse, in this account—the ready
acceptance of racial gerrymandering cases under the civil war amendments,
on the one hand, and the allegedly high-minded repudiation of politically
driven bias suits on the other. But even if one accepts the proffered theoretical
distinctions between political and racial gerrymanders, North Carolina, again,
on the ground, presents conditions and circumstance that mock such
theoretical demarcations. Political life in the Tar Heel State laughs robustly
when the Chief Justice of the United States explains the boundaries of
appropriate and, perhaps, genteel judicial intervention—much like North
Carolina legislators celebrated gleefully, and then acted to aggressively
discriminate against black voters, when John Roberts proclaimed that “the
south has changed” in the Shelby County case,15 as the Court gutted the
Voting Rights Act.16
In this essay, I question what the line between racial and political
gerrymandering can conceivably look like when a state is effectively and
unashamedly governed by a White people’s party. What judicial deference
is, or ought be, assured, when Republican caucuses repair to their closed-door
deliberations, with no person of color present, despite almost a quarter of the
state population being Black,17 and intentionally and repeatedly pass statutes
that court after reviewing court determines burden, penalize, and restrict the
electoral, participatory, adjudicatory and dignitary rights of African14

See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1997), for an argument on how the
Supreme Court has used judicial activism to usurp the authority of the American people to
govern themselves.
15

Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).

16

See id.

17

See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK FACTS (2020), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/NC
(showing that the percentage of black residents in North Carolina is 22.2%).
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Americans? Are the political feints, dodges, and maneuvers of a White
person’s party racial or merely partisan? A century and a half after the
passage of the Civil War Amendments, should a federal court deem the
strategic political tools of a White people’s caucus beyond the reach, or
interest, of constitutional law? Is constitutional law, yet again, to be rendered
a meaningless and—given the stakes—vile façade? Ultimately, Rucho may
make sense, somewhere. That’s possible. But in North Carolina, from whence
it arises, the decision is grotesque. No one here could honestly conclude that
our legislative decisions separate politics and race. Rucho becomes, therefore,
merely an exquisite cover for racism. Yet again.
I. NORTH CAROLINA’S INTENSE RACIAL DISPARITIES
It is helpful, in probing North Carolina’s racialized governance, to begin
with a word of perspective. In 2020, the state remains, as it has been from its
founding, riven by massive and literally debilitating racial disparities. Twice
as many African Americans live in poverty as White people do.18 The gulf is
even worse for kids. Almost three times as many Black children are poor as
White ones.19 The disparity is even larger for kids five and under.20 Much
higher rates of hunger and lack of health insurance appear in the Black
community. 21 African American North Carolinians are twice as likely as
18

See Rob Schofield, New Census Data: High Poverty Rates Persist in NC Despite Modest
Growth,
N.C.
POL’Y
WATCH
(Sept.
14,
2018),
http://pulse.ncpolicywatch.org/2018/09/14/new-census-data-high-poverty-rates-persist-innc-despite-modest-growth/. See also GENE R. NICHOL, THE FACES OF POVERTY IN NORTH
CAROLINA: STORIES FROM OUR INVISIBLE CITIZENS 143 (2018); GENE R. NICHOL, INDECENT
ASSEMBLY: THE NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE’S BLUEPRINT FOR THE WAR ON
DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY 13–14 (2020).
19

See Brian Kennedy, North Carolina Ranked 11th in the Nation in Childhood Poverty,
NORTH
CAROLINA
JUSTICE
CENTER
(Sept.
24,
2018),
https://www.ncjustice.org/publications/north-carolina-ranked-11th-in-the-nation-inchildhood-poverty/.
20

Id.

21

NICHOL, FACES OF POVERTY, supra note 18, at 143. Black North Carolinians suffer hunger
at a much higher rate than White North Carolinians. Gene Nichol, Opinion, Gene Nichol:
Numbers Don’t Lie. There is Systemic Racial Subordination in North Carolina,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., (Apr. 22, 2018), https://greensboro.com/opinion/columns/genenichol-numbers-dont-lie-there-is-systemic-racial-subordination-in-north-
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White North Carolinians to be unemployed, much higher percentages are
uninsured, and three times as many Black families report a negative net
worth.22 Black households possess, on average, only about 6% of the wealth
held by White households.23 Most of North Carolina’s counties experiencing
daunting child poverty rates (approaching or surpassing 50%)—
Northampton, Chowan, Scotland, Vance and Edgecombe—have high
percentages of African-Americans.24
Black kids disproportionately attend North Carolina’s high poverty
public schools.25 Under the state’s controversial A-F public school grading
system, almost all high poverty schools receive exceedingly poor grades and
almost all high wealth institutions excel.26 A university-based study
concluded that Black students make up 26% of the state’s public school
attendees but receive over half of all suspensions.27 In Chapel Hill, where I
live and this article is published, Black students make up 12% of the

carolina/article_2a6e657d-a207-5ed1-a36b-8a3cf8a053ce.html. There are also significant
gaps in the number of Black and White North Carolinians who reported not seeing a doctor
when sick due to the associated cost. Sydney Price, NC Ranks Below Average in Racial
Economic Equality, CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/news/2019/01/31/north-carolina-ranks-belowaverage-in-racial.html.
22

NICHOL, FACES OF POVERTY, supra note 18, at 143.

23

Id. at 143–44; cf. also CTR. ON POVERTY, WORK AND OPPORTUNITY, UNIV. N.C., RACIAL
WEALTH DISPARITY IN NORTH CAROLINA ii (2010) (suggesting the wealth disparity is even
worse, with African American households in North Carolina claiming “about 4 percent of
the net worth of white households.”).
24

NICHOL, INDECENT ASSEMBLY, supra note 18, at 14.

25

See Facts on Child Poverty, PUBLIC SCHOOLS FIRST N.C., (Aug. 30, 2020),
https://www.publicschoolsfirstnc.org/resources/fact-sheets/facts-on-child-poverty/.
26

Lynn Bonner, NC Public School Letter Grades Reflect Wealth of Students’ Families, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh) (Feb. 5, 2015),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article10255961.html.
27

NICHOL, FACES OF POVERTY, supra note 18, at 143.
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enrollment, but get 53% of the school suspensions.28 Twice as many White
Tar Heels have a college degree as do Black ones. 29
Racial disparities are replicated in state institutions and in every aspect
of modern life, as well. Over half of the prisoners in the North Carolina
Department of Correction are African-American, though they constitute 22%
of the state’s population.30 The state incarcerates Black individuals at over
four times the rate of White individuals.31 And an unending cascade of
empirical studies demonstrate massive and unexplainable racial disparities in
policing, employment, housing, and health care.32 North Carolina reflects,
28

Edward J. Smith & Shaun R. Harper, Disproportionate Impact of K-12 School Suspensions
and Expulsion on Black Students in Southern States, CTR. FOR RACE AND EQUITY IN EDUC.
(2015),
https://race.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pub-14-Smith-and-Harper.pdf;
T. Keung Hui, Report Finds NC Black Students Disproportionately Suspended, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh) (Aug. 25, 2015), http:// www.newsobserver.com/news/politicsgovernment/politics-columns-blogs /under-the-dome/article32310816.html.
29

NICHOL, FACES OF POVERTY, supra note 18, at 143.

30

NORTH CAROLINA PRISON POPULATION FIGURES AND DEMOGRAPHICS, fig. 2-3,
https://infogram.com/north-carolina-prison-population-figures-and-demographics1g6qo2q93o1wm78 (last visited Oct. 19, 2020). See also INCARCERATED POPULATIONS BY
RACE/ETHNICITY AND GENDER FOR EACH STATE, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (updated March
2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/data/race_ethnicity_gender_2010.xlsx; Joseph E.
Kennedy & Mika W. Chance, Collateral Damage: How Mass Incarceration Increases
Poverty and Crime in North Carolina’s Poorest African American Communities, TRIAL
BRIEFS (Aug. 2011); ASHLEY NELLIS, SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE:
RACIAL
AND
ETHNIC
DISPARITY
IN
STATE
PRISONS
16
(2016),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-JusticeRacial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf.
31

NORTH CAROLINA PRISON POPULATION FIGURES AND DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 30,
fig. 1 (noting that Black North Carolinians are incarcerated at 4.5 times the incarceration rate
of White North Carolinians); NELLIS, supra note 30, at 5 (listing rate as 4.3 times higher for
Black North Carolinians).
32

See NICHOL, FACES OF POVERTY, supra note 18, at 143–47. See also Nicole Flatow, North
Carolina Police Three Times More Likely to Arrest Blacks after Seat Belt Violation, Study
Finds, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 30, 2013), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/north-carolinapolice-3-times-more-likely-to-arrest-blacks-after-seat-belt-violation-study-findsf9e67221e784/. The data, which N.C. Central University’s Scott Holmes called evidence that
“as an empirical fact . . . we have a culture in our law enforcement for unconscious
institutional racism,” comes as the Department of Justice is filing a lawsuit alleging the
state’s new restrictive voting law is discriminatory and will disenfranchise minority voters.
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and notably amplifies, national trends documented by the Pew Research
Center:
America remains two societies—one white and one black—as
measured by key demographic indicators of social and economic
well-being. [. . .] [B]lacks on average are at least twice as likely as
whites to be poor or unemployed. Households headed by a black
person earn on average little more than half of what the average
white households earns. And in terms of their median net worth,
white households are about 13 times as wealthy as black
households—a gap that has grown wider since the Great
Recession.33

Flatow, supra this note. For additional context, consider also Sharon Lafraniere & Andrew
W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of Driving While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html.
In North Carolina’s third largest city, officers pulled over Black drivers for traffic violations
at a rate far out of proportion to their share of the local driving population. See WILLIAM R.
SMITH ET AL., THE NORTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY TRAFFIC STUDY (Jan. 2004),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/204021.pdf. Police used their discretion to search
Black drivers or their cars more than twice as often as White motorists—even though they
found drugs and weapons significantly more often when the driver was White. Id. These
disparities extend beyond the context of policing. See Matt Shipman, Study Shows That, In
Restaurants, Race Matters, NC STATE UNIV. NEWS (Apr. 23, 2012),
https://news.ncsu.edu/2012/04/wms-rusche-restaurants (describing evidence that one third
of servers in restaurants admit to “varying their quality of service based on customers’ race,
often giving African-Americans inferior service”); COLETTE HOLT & ASSOCS., NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, RACIAL DISPARITY STUDY, 10 (2014),
https://www.ncdot.gov/about-us/board-offices/offices/civil-rights/Documents/2014disparity-study.pdf (describing disparities in Black business formation, access to consumer
credit, and other factors necessary for entrepreneurial success); George Gonzalez, Racial and
Ethnic Minorities Face More Subtle Housing Discrimination: HUD Study Finds Decline in
Blatant Discrimination While Unequal Treatment Persists, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URB.
DEV. (June 11, 2013), https://archives.hud.gov/news/2013/pr13-091.cfm; PAUL A.
BUESCHER & JACK LEISS, N.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., RACE, EDUCATION,
AND
MORTALITY
IN
NORTH
CAROLINA,
(Apr.
1994),
https://archive.org/details/raceeducationmor00bues.
33
PEW RESEARCH CTR., DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING (June
27,
2016),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/06/27/1-demographic-trends-andeconomic-well-being/.
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I begin with these indications of crushing disparity to make the
irrefutable point that, unless the terms are to be drained of all ascertainable
meaning, North Carolina today experiences an intense, debilitating,
and systemic (of, or relating to, the entire body of an organism)34 regime of
racial subordination. No thoughtful and fair-minded person familiar with our
present circumstance could believe that we are done with the challenges of
equality, justice, and meaningful integration. Still, as the following two
sections will reveal, the governing party of the North Carolina legislature for
the past decade has both abandoned aspirations of equality and deployed the
power of the state to burden and penalize African-American Tar Heels.
II. GOVERNING THROUGH WHITE PERSONS’ CAUCUSES
The Republican Party has controlled both houses of the North Carolina
General Assembly since 2011.35 It has often done so through very large
majorities. From 2011 until January 2019, Republicans enjoyed veto-proof
supermajorities in both chambers.36 The margins were reduced in the 2018
elections.37 But they remain large in 2020—ten seats in the House and eight
in the smaller Senate.38
All Republican legislators in North Carolina, in both houses, are White.
As the candid Republican Representative Holly Grange put it in 2019: “On
my side there’s not a lot of diversity; it’s a middle-aged white man’s club.”39
34

See
Systemic,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/systemic (“of, relating to, or common to a system;” “affecting the
body
generally”);
Systemic,
Cambridge
Dictionary
Online,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/systemic (“relating to or involving a
whole system;” “relating to or affecting the whole system, organization, etc., rather than just
some parts of it”).
35

NICHOL, INDECENT ASSEMBLY, supra note 18, at 26.

36

See id.

37

Id.

38

See id. at 27; see also North Carolina Representatives 2019-2020 Session, N.C. GEN.
ASSEMBLY, https://www.ncleg.gov/Members/MemberList/H; North Carolina Senators,
2019-2020 Session, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.ncleg.gov/Members/MemberList/S.
39

Paul Woolverton, How Much Does N.C.’s New Legislature Look Like You?, COURIERTRIBUNE
(Asheboro,
NC)
(Jan.
9,
2019),
https://www.couriertribune.com/article/20190108/NEWS/190108604.
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In 2020, there are twenty-six African American representatives in the state
House.40 There are 10 Black senators.41 One Native American and two Indian
Americans serve in the General Assembly.42 No people of Latinx descent
do.43
The overall numbers, scant as they are, are still deceptive. In the House,
the twenty-six African Americans and one Native American are all
Democrats.44 All sixty-five Republicans are White.45 In the Senate, the ten
African Americans and two Indian Americans are Democrats.46 Every
Republican (twenty-nine) is White.47 Similar Republican tallies appeared in
the 2011–12, 2013–14, 2015–16, and 2017–18 sessions.48 So when the
majority caucuses in each chamber retire to their private deliberations to craft
the laws of North Carolina, only White people attend. That’s the case even
though the state’s population is over 22% African American and about forty
percent persons of color.49 One hundred and fifty years after the adoption of
the 14th Amendment, North Carolina is effectively ruled by a White People’s
Caucus.
Let that sink in for a minute.

40

Gene Nichol, Opinion, In NC, All Diversity Sits on One Side of the Aisle, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh) (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion
/article224507140.html.
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Quick Facts North Carolina (July 1, 2019),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/NC (stating that the percentage of Black residents in
North Carolina is 22.2% and the percentage of white residents who are not Hispanic or Latino
is 62.6%).
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III. THE LEGACY OF THE MODERN NORTH CAROLINA
WHITE PEOPLE’S PARTY
Over the last decade, what legacy has this White people’s caucus
delivered? In a sentence, North Carolina Republican lawmakers have
repeatedly, pervasively, intentionally, and invidiously used the power of
government to diminish the electoral, representational, legal, educational,
and dignitary rights of African Americans. The Republican caucuses of the
North Carolina General Assembly not only look like White conclaves, they
govern like them.
Upon assuming control of both houses of the legislature in 2011,
Republican supermajorities immediately turned to securing their favorable
control of the electoral process. New districting maps, state and federal, were
enacted.50 Each set was eventually ruled unconstitutional by federal courts
for diluting the voting rights of African Americans.51 The United States
House of Representatives’ districts, judges ruled, were not designed to
comply with the Voting Rights Act, as lawmakers claimed, but to
discriminate against Black voters.52 African-Americans had been packed into
contorted districts to minimize their electoral power.53 The U.S. Supreme
Court agreed, after a six-year saga.54
Republican state lawmakers were even more ambitious with their own
districts. On that front, another federal court ruled that the General Assembly
had “unjustifiably, and therefore unconstitutionally, predominantly relied on

50

See Gary Robertson, Court Upholds N.C. District Maps, N.C. PUB. RADIO (Jul. 8, 2013),
https://www.wunc.org/post/court-upholds-nc-district-maps.
51

See Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117, 124 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d, 137 S. Ct.
2211 (2017) (mem.) (“[T]he twenty-eight challenged districts in North Carolina’s 2011 State
House and Senate redistricting plans constitute[d] racial gerrymanders in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.”); Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct.
1455, 1481-82 (2017) (affirming that racial considerations predominated in the creation of
the two congressional districts at issue).
52

See Covington, 316 F.R.D. 117, at 124.

53

See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1469.

54

See id.
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race” in drawing district lines.55 The “overriding priority of the redistricting
plan was to draw a pre-determined, race-based number of districts.”56 Federal
District Court Judge James Wynn was frank to say the scheme to discriminate
was a “widespread, serious, and longstanding . . . constitutional violation.”57
It was, Wynn added, “among the largest racial gerrymanders ever
encountered by a federal court.”58 As a result, it deprived an ample percentage
of North Carolinians of “a constitutionally adequate voice in the State’s
legislature,” defeating foundational ties of popular sovereignty.59
Despite the powerful judicial chastisement, Republican lawmakers
continued to drag their feet—appealing every ruling and delaying
implementation of a meaningful remedy.60 Eventually, on the congressional
side, a three-judge panel declared in exasperation:
We continue to lament that North Carolina voters have now been
deprived of a constitutional congressional districting plan—and,
therefore, constitutional representation in Congress—for six years
and three election cycles.61
The massive state-based gerrymander, federal courts concluded, had:
[So] unjustifiably rel[ied] on race to distort dozens of legislative
district lines, and thereby potentially distort the outcome of elections
and the composition and responsiveness of the legislature, the
districting plans [under which the General Assembly had been
elected] interfered with the very mechanism by which people confer
55

Covington v. North Carolina, 283 F. Supp. 3d 410, 416 (M.D.N.C.), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 138 S. Ct. 2548 (2018).
56

See Covington v. North Carolina, 316 F.R.D. 117, 135 (M.D.N.C. 2016), aff’d, 137 S. Ct.
2211 (2017) (mem.).
57

Covington v. North Carolina, 270 F. Supp. 3d 881, 884 (M.D.N.C. 2017).

58

Id.

59

Covington v. North Carolina, No. 1:15CV399, 2017 WL 44840, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 4,
2017). See also Lynn Bonner, Federal Judges Find NC Legislative Districts
Unconstitutional,
NEWS
&
OBSERVER
(Raleigh)
(Aug.
11,
2016),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/statepolitics/article95080647.html.
60

NICHOL, INDECENT ASSEMBLY, supra note 18, at 132–36.

61

Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 943 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
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their sovereignty on the General Assembly and hold the General
Assembly accountable.62
The racial transgression was so dramatic and persistent that, in 2019, a
Wake County state judge ruled that two electorally adopted amendments to
the North Carolina constitution were invalid because the legislature had
forfeited the authority, under Article XIII of the state charter, to place
proposed amendments on the ballot for adoption by the citizenry.63 The state
constitution, the court reasoned, requires a 3/5 vote of the General Assembly
for electoral consideration.64 However:
[T]he unconstitutional racial gerrymander tainted the three-fifths
majority required by the state constitution before an amendment
proposed can be submitted for a vote, breaking the appropriate chain
of popular sovereignty between North Carolina citizens and their
representatives. [. . .] An illegally constituted General Assembly
does not represent the people of North Carolina and therefore is not
empowered to pass legislation that would amend the state
constitution.65
Republican lawmakers were again called on the carpet, in 2017, for
trying to crush the representational and voting rights of Black candidates and
voters. Unhappy with the outcome of Greensboro City Council elections,
which produced a Democratic majority and four African American
councilors, the General Assembly used a truncated process, pushed by
Republican Senator Trudy Wade, to simply overturn the unseemly results by
creating new districts double-bunking incumbents.66 Wade claimed
legislative immunity in the lawsuit brought to challenge the racial sore-loser
62

Covington v. North Carolina, 270 F. Supp. 3d 881, 897 (M.D.N.C. 2017).

63

See Order at 10–11 N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Moore, 18 CVS 9806 (Wake Cnty.
Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2019) (citing N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 4).
64

See id.

65

Id. at 11. The NAACP v. Moore decision was subsequently reversed, on other grounds, by
the North Carolina Court of Appeals. See No. COA19-384, 2020 WL 5521358 (NC. App.
Sept. 15, 2020).
66

See generally Anne Blythe, Federal Judge Overturns North Carolina Legislative Attempt
to Change Greensboro’s City Election System, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh) (Apr. 3, 2017),
https://www-newsobserver-com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/article142454699.html.
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law to avoid having to explain, or answer for, her discriminatory motives.67
Federal District Court Judge Catherine Eagles saw through the ruse, however,
and held it to be yet another move by the General Assembly to disenfranchise
Black Tar Heels.68
The North Carolina General Assembly’s (all-White) Republican
caucuses didn’t limit their electoral efforts to re-drawing district lines. In
2013, lawmakers passed a massive voter identification and election
regulation law characterized by national scholars as the most restrictive
electoral measure passed by a state government in a half-century.69 It, too,
was largely invalidated by the federal courts.70 The reviewing judges
extensively explored the motivation and methods behind the statute’s
enactment.71 They concluded that Republicans had studied every voting
provision or mechanism that elevated Black turn-out and then eliminated or
restricted each practice “with almost surgical precision.”72 The law reflected
intentional, targeted racial suppression. Its impacts could not sensibly be
regarded as accidental or based on permissible justifications, the court
ruled.73 The claimed interest in ballot integrity was held to be a mere ruse.74
No evidence of in-person voter fraud could be provided.75 “Indeed,” the
three-judge panel wrote, “neither this legislature—nor, as far as we can tell,
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Id.; see also NICHOL, INDECENT ASSEMBLY, supra note 18, at 133–36 (describing “sore
loser” laws).
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See Blythe, supra note 66.
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NATION (July 26, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/north-carolina-passes-countrysworst-voter-suppression-law.
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See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2016).

71
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any other legislature in the country—has ever done so much, so fast, to
restrict access to the franchise.”76
The General Assembly also moved to diminish the rights of African
Americans in the criminal justice system. In 2009, North Carolina (then under
Democratic control) had enacted the groundbreaking Racial Justice Act,
which required courts to vacate a death sentence when it was proven to have
been “sought or obtained on the basis of race.”77 The goal of the statute was
to ensure that if North Carolina were to continue to enforce a death penalty,
racial bias would play no role in its implementation.78 The statute was aimed
particularly at racially discriminatory practices in death cases, including bias
in jury selection.79 In 2012, Cumberland County Superior Court Judge
Gregory A. Weeks cited the Act in overturning Marcus Robinson’s death
sentence after concluding that highly reliable evidence showed prosecutors
intentionally discriminated against Black defendants in selecting juries in
capital cases.80 A few months later, three other previously convicted
individuals proved that prosecutors had also blocked African Americans from
jury service.81 Their death sentences (not the underlying convictions) were
vacated.82
In 2013, the Republican General Assembly decided it had seen enough
and repealed the Racial Justice Act.83 Rather than addressing the injustices

76

Id. at 228. Another federal court ruled, again in 2019, that the General Assembly’s second
attempt to pass this law did not do enough to purge the taint of racially discriminatory
purpose of the original bill. See NAACP v. Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 35 (M.D.N.C. 2019).
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motion for appropriate relief).
81

State v. Golphin, No. 97 CRS 47314-15, 98 CRS 34832, 35044, 01 CRS 65079 (N.C.
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Carolina Repeals Racial Justice Act, NAT’L COAL. TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY (July
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revealed in the early racial justice cases, lawmakers chose, in effect, to kill
the messenger. A freshman (Democratic) legislator who opposed the repeal
said:
Even though I’m new here, I understand that there was evidence of
racial bias when the legislature adopted the Racial Justice Act.
Subsequent court cases confirmed this bias. So why are we reversing
the law now given all of this evidence?84
Democratic Sen. Martin Nesbitt asked even more pointedly, “If we have
somebody on death row because they’re black, wouldn’t we want to find that
out?”85 Republican legislators seemingly disagreed.
In public education, perhaps unsurprisingly, the Republican General
Assembly embraced steps leading to greater racial segregation. A state law
opening the doors to charter schools enacted in 1996 had included a
numerical cap on such institutions (100) and required schools to reflect the
racial and ethnic composition of the districts in which they were located.86 In
2013, lawmakers eliminated the ceiling and repealed the diversity
requirement, demanding only that charter schools “make efforts” to achieve
integration.87 The results were predictable. A 2017 study by the Raleigh News
& Observer concluded that “charter schools in North Carolina are more
segregated than traditional public schools and have more affluent students.”88
A 2018 study by the North Carolina Justice Center traced the segregating
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(Oct.
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impact of charters on the traditional school system.89 The proliferation of
charter schools “exacerbates racial segregation,” it concluded.90 Charter
schools “tend to skew whiter than other schools in the same county.”91
In 2018 Republican lawmakers broke new ground by enacting a measure
permitting four suburban towns in Mecklenburg County, with mostly White
populations, to create their own charter schools and limit enrollments to
students from within their borders.92 This effectively allowed the small
enclaves to withdraw from the broad and racially and economically diverse
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district. The experiment also allowed the
municipalities—Cornelius, Huntersville, Matthews, and Mint Hill—to spend
property tax dollars on the charters.93 The North Carolina NAACP’s Irv
Joyner described the move as “an effort to go back to the 1900s with Jim
Crow where these enclaves for whites are being allowed to be set up.”94
James Ford, a North Carolina teacher of the year, wrote that the bill was “a
design for racial and economic segregation. . . . We’ve seen this before. Only
this time it is not white flight, it’s building a ‘white fence.’”95
There’s more, of course, though I know the listing grows tedious. As the
Black Lives Matter movement swept the nation in 2013 and 2014, fueled by
police brutality caught on ever pervasive cameras, North Carolina legislators
bucked the national trend by making it more difficult, legally, to obtain or
89

See T. Keung Hui, NC Should Close Charter Schools That Aren’t Diverse, New Report
Says, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh) (March 16, 2018), https://www.news
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92

Valerie Strauss, North Carolina Passes Charter School Law That Critics Say Is Meant to
Promote
Segregation,
WASH.
POST
(June
14,
2018),
https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2018/06/14/north-carolina-passescharter-school-law-that-critics-say-is-intended-to-promote-segregation.
93

Id.

94

Id.

95

James Ford, Editorial, Matthews v. CMS: Yes, The Fight About Charter Schools Is About
Race, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (updated Apr. 27, 2018, 7:44 AM), https://www.charlotte
observer.com/opinion/op-ed/article209884959.html.

84

SEPARATING RACE AND POLITICS IN A WHITE PEOPLE’S PARTY
publish police video camera footage.96 More famously, at least in North
Carolina, in 2015 the General Assembly passed General Statute 100-2.1,
which requires the approval of the state historical commission before any
confederate monument can be moved or taken down, even temporarily.97 The
law was principally designed to prevent the removal of the “Silent Sam”
statue at the gateway of the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
campus.98 After the horrifying killing of an anti-racist protester in
Charlottesville, Virginia, the governor of North Carolina asked that the
monuments law be repealed, saying “[w]e cannot continue to glorify a war
against the United States of America fought in the defense of slavery.”99 The
White caucuses of the Republican General Assembly refused. One of the
monument bill’s principal authors, Senator Tommy Tucker, explained that
the Civil War had nothing to do with slavery: “It was caused by the North
and their tariffs over southern goods.”100 Nice touch.
IV. POLITICS VS. RACE IN A WHITE PEOPLE’S PARTY
So now we arrive, finally, back at the original question. What is the
appropriate line to be drawn between racial and political gerrymandering
96
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when reviewing the handiwork of the all-White, heavily racialized,
discrimination-driven, Republican house and senate caucuses of a state
General Assembly? How much judicial deference is to be proffered for the
political stratagems developed to foster and enhance this unseemly work? Are
the political moves of a White People’s party non-justiciable? Are they racial
or (merely) partisan?
Shaw v. Reno,101 Shaw v. Hunt,102 Easley v. Cromartie,103 and Cooper v.
Harris,104 it will be recalled, determined that the use of race as the
predominant factor in legislative districting is presumptively
unconstitutional.105 The Equal Protection Clause’s “central mandate is racial
neutrality in governmental decisionmaking,”106 so efforts to “separate voters
into different districts on the basis of race” must satisfy the rigors of strict
scrutiny.107
Rucho v. Common Cause108 nevertheless proclaimed that racial and
political gerrymandering are categorically distinct creatures.109 Political
gerrymander might be unseemly, but it is not constitutionally forbidden.110
Securing “partisan advantage . . . does not become constitutionally
impermissible, like race discrimination, when [it] ‘predominates.’”111
Partisan gerrymandering claims trigger “no legal standards to limit and
direct” judicial decision-making.112 Echoing Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
sentiments from an earlier case, Chief Justice Roberts theorized that “[a]ny
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509 U.S. 630 (1993).

102

517 U.S. 899 (1996).

103

532 U.S. 234 (2001).

104

137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).

105

See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text.

106

Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995).

107

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 649, 653.

108

139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).

109

See id. at 2496–97.

110

Id. at 2497.

111

Id. at 2503; cf. supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that racial gerrymanders are
unconstitutional).
112

86

Id. at 2507.

SEPARATING RACE AND POLITICS IN A WHITE PEOPLE’S PARTY
standard for resolving [political gerrymandering] claims must be grounded in
a ‘limited and precise rationale’ and be ‘clear, manageable, and politically
neutral.’”113 He was not able to find such standards, apparently. While racebased decision-making “is inherently suspect,” “lines . . . drawn on the basis
of partisanship” are therefore not.114 Partisanship objection is inevitably a
question of degree—“how much partisan dominance is too much.”115 The
Court insisted that such a lament should be directed to the legislatures
(ironically), not to the federal courts.116
There is much that can be said about the Chief Justice’s line of judicial
demarcation. The Federal Courts professor in me would note Roberts’ nearobliteration of the previously somewhat manageable political question
doctrine.117 The minimalist and reasonably precise requirements of the
jurisdictional standard were stretched, or altered, notably. The “textual
commitment” standard, before Rucho, marked the heart of the political
question determination.118 But Rucho highlights no precise “textually
demonstrable commitment” separating population and racial gerrymandering
cases, on the one hand, and political gerrymandering actions on the other.
Now no one knows what the standard means or if it remains the central
requisite of the jurisdictional determination.
Nor, I’m guessing, would voting rights scholars agree that the Supreme
Court’s track record in racial gerrymandering cases—looking at the
“predominance of race” and the strength of justification flowing from Voting
Rights Act’s integrative compliance obligations—reflects a “limited and

113

Id. at 2498 (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–08 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
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precise rationale” deploying “clear, manageable and politically neutral”
standards. Roberts’ portrait of precision in the race cases is dream work.119
But these traditionally picked nits are not my focus here. My question is
whether the partisan gyrations of a White people’s governing legislative
caucus can meaningfully be deemed non-racial. If an all-White governing
caucus, repeatedly demonstrated to be carrying out a race-based substantive
legislative agenda, deploys politically biased strategies to further its
governing power, are courts to defer to such choices in the name of protected
democratic decision-making? When the all-White caucuses of the North
Carolina Republican legislature engaged in the most politically distorted
district drawing in American history in order to secure and expand their
racialized proclivities, can it actually be that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
amendments are untroubled? Is constitutional law, in fact, an ass?
Is the phantom race versus politics distinction capable of moving beyond
lodging place in re-districting cases? Is it literally permissible, as Republican
leaders claim in North Carolina,120 to impose debilitating voter ID
requirements upon Black voters so long as the burden is purportedly levied
because the potential voters are Democrats, not because they are Black?
African-Americans have been offered a dizzying array of justifications for
their abuse at the hands of a White majority in North Carolina over the
centuries. Is “I’m not after you because you’re Black, I’m after you because
you’re a Democrat” yet one more of them?
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Compare Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880–89 (1994), with id. at 891 (Thomas, J.,
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Does the cloak of “mere” partisanship extend further? The state of North
Carolina has a broad and impressive public university system.121 It is
overseen by a legislatively selected Board of Governors.122 It now seems to
be the case that the Board of Governors, and its benefactors in the all-White
Republican legislative caucuses, will allow only a Republican to become the
president of the university system.123 The theory, I suppose, is that the
legislative majority demands one of its own. Can the White person’s caucus
also, in solidarity, demand only a White president? No, you say, that would
be overt race discrimination. But the reed is thin. Thinner than piss on a rock.
And does the Shaw/Rucho, racial/political line offer an odd benefit or
incentive to White people’s parties? In Cooper v. Harris, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated yet another North Carolina racial gerrymander.124
The state, unsurprisingly, claimed as a defense that the line-drawing was
merely partisan in nature, not racial.125 The Justices rejected the political
gerrymandering justification, as had the trial court below.126 The Cooper
majority, though, conceded that “racial identification is [often] highly
correlated with political affiliation.”127 As a result, a federal trial court must
make “a sensitive inquiry” into all “circumstantial and direct evidence of
intent” to assess whether the “plaintiffs have managed to disentangle race
from politics and prove that the former drove a district’s lines.”128
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In dissent, Justice Alito emphasized an even more robust presumption
that state legislators had acted permissibly:
We have stressed, however, that courts are obligated to “exercise
extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a State has drawn
district lines on the basis of race.” . . . “Federal-court review of
districting legislation represents a serious intrusion on the most vital
of local functions,” and “the good faith of a state legislature must be
presumed.” . . . A legislature will “almost always be aware of racial
demographics” during redistricting, but evidence of such awareness
does not show that the legislature violated equal protection.
. . . Instead, the Court has held, “race must not simply have been a
motivation for the drawing of a majority-minority district, but the
predominant factor motivating the legislature’s districting
decision.” . . . This evidentiary burden “is a demanding one.” . . .
We have warned that courts must be very cautious about imputing a
racial motive to a State’s redistricting plan.129
It stands to reason, perhaps, that separating the political and racial
motivations of a White person’s government, aiming to carry out a heavily
racialized, programmatic, substantive platform, will be a tough and
demanding—if not impossible—duty. The admixture of intentions will
become all the more successfully intertwined as the segregation advances,
becoming increasingly complete. The “Whiter” the party, the more feasible
the claim of purportedly benign partisan service. And it is nasty business, of
course, for a federal court to rule that a state legislature has acted on the basis
of race.130 A presumption against such a determination must be afforded.131
Leeway must be given, lest we accuse legislators of being brutes. Thus, a
White people’s caucus is afforded an assumption of justifiability that simply
doesn’t arise in the run-of-the-mill re-districting case. An incentive, in effect,
is offered to the all-White caucus like North Carolina’s. Federal judges must
129

Id. at 1487–88 (Alito, J., concurring in part) (capitalization cleaned up) (emphasis
original) (citations omitted).
130
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131
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be “very cautious” lest they appear rude and accusatory by casting racial
aspersions. It is, after all, 2020, not 1953. So political deference, the theory
seems to go, must be extended to a White people’s government’s claims of
partisan dedication. Otherwise, we might be seen as suggesting that the (allWhite) lawmakers are behaving in ways that are reprehensible, even as they
carry out schemes that are, in fact, reprehensible. There is nothing more
infuriating to a White people’s party than being called racist, after all. They
are to be sure deploying government power to subjugate on the basis of race.
Still, it is better for Black Tar Heels to continue to suffer than for White ones
to be made to feel bad about themselves.
Rucho, of course, was a political question decision—a jurisdictional
ruling—not technically a judgment on the merits of the equality claims
proffered.132 That, when added to the fact that state courts are free to read
their own constitutions as more protective of individual rights than the federal
charter,133 left open the possibility that state tribunals would come to the
opposite conclusion about the legality of extreme partisan gerrymandering
under the provisions of the North Carolina Constitution. That is precisely
what happened in Common Cause v. Lewis in September 2019.134 There, a
unanimous three-judge state court (with both Republican and Democratic
judges) explained:
The issue before the Court is distilled to simply this: whether the
constitutional rights of North Carolina citizens are infringed when
the General Assembly, for purposes of retaining power, draws
district maps with a predominant intent to favor voters aligned with
one political party at the expense of other voters, and in fact achieves
results that manifest this intent and cannot be explained by other
non-partisan considerations.135
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The judges found that North Carolina’s 2017 state legislative maps had been
drawn by the General Assembly with the partisan goal of perpetuating
Republican control, that state lawmakers had deployed that intention “with
surgical precision,” and that their efforts reflected “extreme outliers” of
partisanship.136 Accordingly, “it [was] the carefully crafted maps, not the will
of the voters, that dictated the election outcomes in a significant number of
legislative districts and, ultimately, (determined) the majority control of the
General Assembly.”137 Such purposeful and pervasive cheating, the judges
held, violated the central tenets of the North Carolina Constitution.138
Several weeks later, a North Carolina state court held that the state’s
federal congressional districts represented unconstitutional political
gerrymanders as well—taking the explicit step the United States Supreme
Court had avoided in Rucho.139 Eric Holder, former United States Attorney
General, said that “[f]or nearly a decade, Republicans have forced the people
of North Carolina to vote in districts that were manipulated for their own
partisan advantage . . . . Now—finally—the era of Republican
gerrymandering in the state is coming to an end.”140
No doubt Common Cause v. Lewis is a direct political gerrymandering
decision—saying, explicitly, that what the United States Supreme Court
taught, enthusiastically, for seven decades, to be the demands of the equal
protection clause in population and racial gerrymandering cases does not
mysteriously disappear in partisanship cases. I’m convinced that no small
part of the impetus for such a determination for judges actually witnessing
political life in North Carolina was that concluding that the actions of an allWhite legislative assembly, protecting its continuing efforts to carry forward
an intensely racialized substantive legislative agenda, had little to do with
race discrimination seemed too absurd. Simply a bridge too far. It might
136
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provide exquisite cover for Chief Justice Roberts and his Rucho colleagues—
cover well and intentionally wrought. On race matters, after all, they seem to
delight in exalting form over substance.141 On the ground in North Carolina,
though, no one believes it. No one.
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